Friday, June 20, 2008

Franchising Outside of the U.S.

FRANCHISING


U.S. Restaurants Push Abroad
By RICHARD GIBSON

Perhaps nowhere is the Americanization of the planet more evident than in the restaurant world.

There's an Applebee's in Athens; a Papa John's pizzeria in Karachi, Pakistan; two Ruby Tuesdays in Bucharest; a Denny's in Christchurch, New Zealand; a Chili's Grill & Bar on a riverboat on the Egyptian Nile. And always there are the seemingly ubiquitous outposts of McDonald's, Domino's and KFCs that keep popping up, like tourists on holiday, wherever one goes.

As the restaurant industry in the U.S. turns increasingly dour, major brands are turning their attention abroad, where business remains relatively robust and growing middle classes are creating large pools of consumers eager to taste affordable American-style fare.

Not only do the companies encounter less competition there than in the U.S., but newly arrived brands also typically enjoy a novelty aura that attracts the curious. Finally, many franchisers sell operating rights to local businesspeople, who assume responsibility for the restaurants day to day and send royalty payments back to the chains' home offices, often giving the corporate owners a superior return on their investment.

"Trends continue to be in our favor," says McDonald's Corp. President Ralph Alvarez. "We're growing [abroad] because demand exceeds our supply."

Many investors in McDonald's and multi-fast-food giant Yum Brands Inc. are holding those stocks precisely because of the perceived opportunities overseas.

This year, Burger King, McDonald's and Papa John's International Inc. are among chains intending to open more restaurants abroad than at home. And in laying out plans for combining Wendy's International Inc. with its Arby's sandwich business, Triarc Cos. said it sees substantial possibilities abroad, where both brands have relatively few outlets.

YUM, which owns Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and Long John Silver's, along with KFC, estimates that within 10 years 70% of its profits will come from outside the U.S. Today, about 55% does.

The company is a stellar example of how to cook up overseas potential. China, a market it entered 21 years ago, today delivers about 25% of the company's annual profits. Its KFC brand has more than 2,000 locations in 500 cities across the Chinese mainland, with restaurants that not only serve chicken but also congee soup and fried dough at breakfast. (McDonald's, which followed KFC to China, has fewer than half that number.) Yum is even venturing into the coals-to-Newcastle business of selling its version of Chinese food to the Chinese.

With 15,000 of its 35,000 restaurants outside the U.S., Yum continues to seek out new markets. KFC soon will enter Nigeria, its 106th country. Next year Yum plans to test the popularity of its best-selling domestic brand, Taco Bell, in India.

Casual-dining operators also are trekking abroad in search of profits. Chili's parent, Brinker International Inc., which says its long-term vision is to become the "dominant, global casual-dining restaurant portfolio company," last year signed development agreements to expand in Australia, Canada, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, Portugal, South Korea and Turkey.

As in the U.S., McDonald's says, finding the right location is the company's biggest challenge abroad. Prime real-estate targets are increasingly in suburbs ringing the cities of Europe, Asia and Latin America. The world's largest hamburger chain, McDonald's has more than 17,500, or about 56% of its restaurants, outside the U.S.

While McDonald's Mr. Alvarez says that "we're not looking for new countries" to enter, archrival Burger King has been doing just that. In fiscal 2007, the No. 2 company in hamburger restaurants behind McDonald's went into Japan, Poland, Egypt and Indonesia. In the past two years it has opened 34 restaurants in 14 cities in Brazil alone.

Another dominant U.S. player abroad is Domino's Pizza Inc., with some 3,500 stores, or about 40% of its total, outside the U.S. That 25-year overseas presence recently helped offset disappointing domestic results; in the last quarter, international comparable sales -- free from the intense competition that has roiled the U.S. pizza market -- rose 8.8% from a year ago while Domino's domestic business experienced a 5.2% drop.

Some restaurateurs modify their menus to cater to local tastes. In some parts of Asia, for instance, McDonald's serves rice burgers: shredded beef between rice patties. Customers in the Netherlands can order a deep-fried patty of beef ragout. In India, its Big Mac -- called the Maharaja Mac -- is made with chicken rather than beef. But, says Mr. Alvarez, "our core menu is still what you know in the U.S. People come to McDonald's because they want an American product."

Overseas success isn't a sure bet. Papa John's stumbled on its first foreign sojourn, when it entered Mexico in 1998. "We didn't have our act together," says David Flanery, president of the pizza company's international operations. "We had the wrong franchise partner."

As a result, the company eventually closed most of its 40-or-so stores there, found new local operators, revised its support structure and started over. Today, the Louisville-based firm has pizzerias in 28 countries.

Despite the allure, some big U.S. restaurateurs haven't ventured outside North America. They include Cheesecake Factory Inc., Jack In The Box Inc., Panera Bread Co., CBRL Group's Cracker Barrel Old Country Store chain and Darden Restaurants Inc.. Each has indicated it sees significant growth at home.

"We periodically look at international expansion to understand where opportunities exist," says Darden spokesman Rich Jeffers. "However, given the momentum that we have at our existing businesses and given the potential that we have with LongHorn [steakhouse], Bahama Breeze, Capital Grille and Seasons 52, we believe that our focus on domestic opportunity will consume most of our time over the next few years." Darden does operate a smattering of Olive Garden and Red Lobster restaurants in Canada.

Write to Richard Gibson at dick.gibson@dowjones.com

Thursday, June 19, 2008

McDonald's and the McCafe

Conventional wisdom says McDonald’s should continue to have great success as the economy slows and consumers trade down restaurants just as they’ve been trading down to Wal-Mart for their shopping needs. Sounds great, except that the company's insiders beg to differ: Over the last six months, nearly 760,000 shares worth some $43 million have been sold.

A significant amount by any measure, this works out to roughly a 20% liquidation of the insiders according to Thomson Financial. CEO James Skinner sold 35% of his stake. Gloria Santona, the general counsel, parted with more than half of her shares. Jose Armario, responsible for Canada and Latin America, traded away 80% of his holdings.

My guess is that they’re less than confident about the big McCafé push. Better drip coffee is one thing, and McDonald’s definitely has good drip coffee. But going head-to-head with Starbucks is another. Don’t kid yourself: McDonald’s will never be Starbucks -- and by the look of things it probably doesn’t want to be Starbucks anyway. There just isn’t any synergy between burgers, fries, and cappuccinos.

Consider demographics and brand personality. Starbucks is urban, born in Seattle, and populated by graduate students looking for single-origin coffees from Africa. McDonald’s is Mainstreet U.S.A., packed full of blue-collar men, moms and kids, and broke teens ordering off the dollar menu. If you can’t picture a truck driver from Wyoming ordering a double-pump vanilla non-fat latté, then McCafé is doomed -- especially with all the competition entering the field.

That isn’t to say all hope is lost. Going upscale with better chicken items, salads and fruits, and remodeled restaurants has been successful. Better quality hamburgers featuring Angus beef are being tested in select markets. Efforts should continue to focus on improving and expanding the food offerings, taking into account the lessons of the Arch Deluxe failure.

McDonald’s head chef Dan Coudreaut, labeled the “Most Powerful Chef in America,” has already demonstrated success with the Asian Salad and McSkillet Burritos. Given the continued emphasis on fitness and health in society, there is a big opportunity for McDonald’s to clean up its image. Offering fresh vegetables in Happy Meals would be a good start. Bringing back the deli sandwiches would be another.

Until then, rising food prices will pinch margins hard, sales will drag, and free cashflow will be tied up in the coffee fiasco. Maybe shares won’t tumble, but it’s hard to see them going much higher from here.

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FRANCHISE LEADERSHIP & DEVELOPMENT

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Landry's CEO to Buy Company

Landry's CEO to buy company for $1.3 bln
Source: Reuters
Posted: 06/16/08 5:04PM
Filed Under: Main
(Recasts; adds details, background, analysts' comments)
By Anne Pallivathuckal
BANGALORE, June 16 (Reuters) - Landry's Restaurants agreed to be bought by Chief Executive Tilman Fertitta for about $1.3 billion, including debt, almost six months after he made his initial offer for the restaurant-chain operator, but left the door open for opposing bids from third parties.
Fertitta will pay $21.00 a share in cash, about 25 percent more than the stock's Friday closing price of $16.79. The deal value of $1.3 billion includes about $885.0 million of debt.
Landry's shares, which have lost almost half their value over the past year, surged 20 percent to touch a high of $20.15 Monday.
The deal represents a triumph for Fertitta over skeptics who had doubted his ability to secure funding for the deal as the credit crunch squeezed debt markets.
The 50-year-old Fertitta, whose cousins Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta took Las Vegas casino operator Station Casinos private in a management-led buyout last year, had in January offered to buy Landry's for $23.50 a share.
But in April Fertitta, who has been with the company for more than two decades and owns about 39 percent of Landry's, cut his offer price to $21 a share as credit market conditions worsened, making it far more costly to obtain the debt financing needed for the deal.
But Landry's on Monday said Fertitta, whose offer values the stock at about 16 times forward earnings, has received debt financing commitments from Jefferies Funding LLC, Jefferies & Co Inc, Jefferies Finance LLC and Wells Fargo Foothill LLC to fund the acquisition.
The company, which competes with Texas Roadhouse , CBRL Group Inc , and larger rivals DineEquity Inc and Darden Restaurants , said the deal is expected to be completed in about four months, during which time it will stop payment of its regular quarterly dividend of 5 cents per share.
Landry's, which operates the iconic Golden Nugget Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas and several casual-dining outlets, said a special committee will solicit other acquisition proposals from third parties for about 45 days following the signing of the merger agreement.
SMH Capital analyst William Hamilton said he expects the deal with Fertitta to go through since the board has approved the deal with the funding. An employee of SMH Capital is a director of Landry's Restaurants.
There have been no other bidders for the restaurant-chain operator since Fertitta's initial offer in January and Hamilton said he didn't anticipate another bidder emerging as the current economic environment and credit markets make it difficult to raise capital.
Hamilton also drew attention to the fact that Fertitta owns 39 percent of Landry's, giving him an edge over other potential suitors.
The analyst said Fertitta's offer appears to be the best for the company, whose shares have seen a slide from a high of $32.30 last July as consumers reign in spending amid rising fuel prices, uncertainty in the credit markets and a weakening economy.
The company was also hurt by creditors demanding early repayment of a $400 million bond issue, before it finally agreed in August last year to reinstate the 7.5 percent senior notes, increasing the interest rate to 9.5 percent.
Under the agreement, at 18 months, the company would have an option to redeem the bonds or for the noteholders an option to call the bonds.
If the buyout is successful, the bonds will be refinanced as part of the deal, Standard & Poor's credit analyst Charles Pinson-Rose said. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has a 'B' corporate credit rating on Landry's and on CreditWatch with negative implications.
Shares of the Houston, Texas-based company were trading up $2.91 at $19.70 Monday afternoon on the New York Stock Exchange. (Editing by Pratish Narayanan)

Saturday, June 14, 2008

Francorp Client - Friendly's Ice Cream

Press Releases - Ice Cream and Smoothie FranchisesEstablished Restaurateur Will Open 12 Restaurants in Raleigh-Durham,Wilmington and Lumberton.WILBRAHAM, Mass. (December 4, 2006) - - Friendly’s Restaurants Franchise, Inc., one of America’s most successful restaurant franchises, today announced that it will significantly expand its presence in North Carolina through a development agreement with established restaurateur Cliford E. Bullard, Jr. Under the development agreement, Bullard will open three Friendly’s restaurants in the Raleigh-Durham, Wilmington and Lumberton markets with the option for nine additional restaurants. The first restaurant is scheduled to open in Lumberton by the end of June 2007, and all 12 locations will be open by June 2013. Friendly’s current North Carolina location is in Huntersville. Cliford “Clif” Bullard, Jr., has more than 25 years of multi-concept restaurant experience. He owns and operates 19 Burger King and eight Smithfield’s Chicken ‘n Barbecue franchises, primarily in North and South Carolina.“We have long regarded North Carolina as an extremely important strategic market for Friendly’s, and in Clif Bullard we believe we have found the perfect partner to expand our presence here,” said Jim Sullivan, vice president, franchising and real estate development. “Clif’s record as a restaurateur speaks for itself. With his operations expertise and his understanding of local store marketing, he was an ideal choice for Friendly’s and we are confident that he and his team will help make the Friendly’s brand a tremendous success in North Carolina.” Friendly’s, named among the nation’s 25 top performing franchises by the Wall Street Journal, opened its first location in Springfield, Mass., in 1935 and now has more than 500 locations in 16 states.“With delicious food and signature ice cream offered in a concept with five day-parts, the opportunity for volume and growth is outstanding. Friendly’s top-notch marketing and operations teams offer the complete package of products and support services needed in today’s marketplace.”Each Friendly’s will bring additional jobs and tax revenues to the local area. “I’m looking forward to making Friendly’s an active and valued part of the Raleigh-Durham, Wilmington, and Lumberton communities,” Bullard added. The announcement is part of an ongoing franchise expansion strategy by Friendly’s, which has announced plans for 23 restaurants in the last 10 months. Friendly Ice Cream Corporation (Amex: FRN) is a vertically integrated restaurant company serving signature sandwiches, entrees and ice cream desserts in a friendly, family environment in more than 515 company and franchised restaurants throughout the Northeast. The company also manufactures ice cream, which is distributed through more than 4,500 supermarkets and other retail locations. With a 71-year operating history, Friendly's enjoys strong brand recognition and is currently revitalizing its restaurants and introducing new products to grow its customer base.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Case Study on Starbucks

Starbucks Corporation
Background 1971-87
Private Company 1987-92
Public Company 1992-
Starbucks Becomes a Public Company
Starbucks' initial public offering (IPO) of common stock in June 1992 turned into one of the most successful IPOs of the year (see Exhibit 3 for the performance of the company's stock price since the IPO). With the capital afforded it by being a public company, Starbucks accelerated the expansion of its store network (see Exhibit 1). Starbucks' success helped specialty coffee products begin to catch on across the United States. Competitors, some imitating the Starbucks model, began to spring up in many locations. The Specialty Coffee Association of America predicted that the number of coffee cafés in the United States would rise from 500 in 1992 to 10,000 by 1999.
The Store Expansion Strategy
In 1992 and 1993 Starbucks developed a three-year geographic expansion strategy that targeted areas which not only had favorable demographic profiles but which also could be serviced and supported by the company's operations infrastructure. For each targeted region, Starbucks selected a large city to serve as a "hub"; teams of professionals were located in hub cities to support the goal of opening 20 or more stores in the hub in the first two years. Once stores blanketed the hub, then additional stores were opened in smaller, surrounding "spoke" areas in the region. To oversee the expansion process, Starbucks created zone vice presidents to direct the development of each region and to implant the Starbucks culture in the newly opened stores. All of the new zone vice presidents Starbucks recruited came with extensive operating and marketing experience in chain-store retailing.
Starbucks' store launches grew steadily more successful. In 1995, new stores generated an average of $700,000 in revenue in their first year, far more than the average of $427,000 in 1990. This was partly due to the growing reputation of the Starbucks brand. In more and more instances, Starbucks' reputation reached new markets even before stores opened. Moreover, existing stores continued to post year-to-year gains in sales (see Exhibit 1).
Starbucks had notable success in identifying top retailing sites for its stores. The company had the best real estate team in the coffee-bar industry and a sophisticated system that enabled it to identify not only the most attractive individual city blocks but also the exact store location that was best. The company's site location track record was so good that as of 1997 it had closed only 2 of the 1,500 sites it had opened.
Real Estate, Store Design, Store Planning, and Construction
Schultz formed a headquarters group to create a store development process based on a six-month opening schedule. Starting in 1991, the company began to create its own in-house team of architects and designers to ensure that each store would convey the right image and character. Stores had to be custom-designed because the company didn't buy real estate and build its own freestanding structures like McDonald's or Wal-Mart did; rather, each space was leased in an existing structure and thus each store differed in size and shape. Most stores ranged in size from 1,000 to 1,500 square feet and were located in office buildings, downtown and suburban retail centers, airport terminals, university campus areas, or busy neighborhood shopping areas convenient to pedestrian foot traffic. Only a select few were in suburban malls. While similar materials and furnishings were used to keep the look consistent and expenses reasonable, no two stores ended up being exactly alike.
In 1994, Starbucks began to experiment with a broader range of store formats. Special seating areas were added to help make Starbucks a place where customers could meet and chat or simply enjoy a peaceful interlude in their day. Grand Cafés with fireplaces, leather chairs, newspapers, couches, and lots of ambience were created to serve as flagship stores in high-traffic, high-visibility locations. The company also experimented with drive-through windows in locations where speed and convenience were important to customers and with kiosks in supermarkets, building lobbies, and other public places.
To better reduce average store-opening costs, which had reached an undesirably high $350,000 in 1995, the company centralized buying, developed standard contracts and fixed fees for certain items, and consolidated work under those contractors who displayed good cost-control practices. The retail operations group outlined exactly the minimum amount of equipment each core store needed, so that standard items could be ordered in volume from vendors at 20 to 30 percent discounts, then delivered just in time to the store site either from company warehouses or the vendor. Modular designs for display cases were developed. And the whole store layout was developed on a computer, with software that allowed the costs to be estimated as the design evolved. All this cut store-opening costs significantly and reduced store development time from 24 to 18 weeks.
A "stores of the future" project team was formed in 1995 to raise Starbucks' store design to a still higher level and come up with the next generation of Starbucks stores. Schultz and Olsen met with the team early on to present their vision for what a Starbucks store should be like—"an authentic coffee experience that conveyed the artistry of espresso making, a place to think and imagine, a spot where people could gather and talk over a great cup of coffee, a comforting refuge that provided a sense of community, a third place for people to congregate beyond work or the home, a place that welcomed people and rewarded them for coming, and a layout that could accommodate both fast service and quiet moments." The team researched the art and literature of coffee throughout the ages, studied coffee-growing and coffee-making techniques, and looked at how Starbucks stores had already evolved in terms of design, logos, colors, and mood. The team came up with four store designs—one for each of the four stages of coffee making: growing, roasting, brewing, and aroma—each with its own color combinations, lighting scheme, and component materials. Within each of the four basic store templates, Starbucks could vary the materials and details to adapt to different store sizes and settings (downtown buildings, college campuses, neighborhood shopping areas). In late 1996, Starbucks began opening new stores based on one of the four templates. The company also introduced two ministore formats using the same styles and finishes: the brevebar, a store-within-a-store for supermarkets or office-building lobbies, and the doppio, a self-contained 8-square-foot space that could be moved from spot to spot. Management believed the project accomplished three objectives: better store designs, lower store-opening costs (about $315,000 per store on average), and formats that allowed sales in locations Starbucks could otherwise not consider.
For a number of years, Starbucks avoided debt and financed new stores entirely with equity capital. But as the company's profitability improved and its balance sheet strengthened, Schultz's opposition to debt as a legitimate financing vehicle softened. In 1996 the company completed its second debt offering, netting $161 million from the sale of convertible debentures for use in its capital construction program. Exhibit 6, Exhibit 7, and Exhibit 8 present Starbucks' income statement and balance sheet data for recent years.
Product Line
Starbucks stores offered a choice of regular or decaffeinated coffee beverages, a special "coffee of the day," and a broad selection of Italian-style espresso drinks. In addition, customers could choose from a wide selection of fresh-roasted whole-bean coffees (which could be ground on the premises and carried home in distinctive packages), a selection of fresh pastries and other food items, sodas, juices, teas, and coffee-related hardware and equipment. In 1997, the company introduced its Starbucks Barista home espresso machine featuring a new portafilter system that accommodated both ground coffee and Starbucks' new ready-to-use espresso pods. Power Frappuccino—a version of the company's popular Frappuccino blended beverage, packed with protein, carbohydrates, and vitamins—was tested in several markets during 1997; another promising new product being tested for possible rollout in 1998 was Chai Tea Lattè, a combination of black tea, exotic spices, honey, and milk.
The company's retail sales mix was roughly 61 percent coffee beverages, 15 percent whole-bean coffees, 16 percent food items, and 8 percent coffee-related products and equipment. The product mix in each store varied, depending on the size and location of each outlet. Larger stores carried a greater variety of whole coffee beans, gourmet food items, teas, coffee mugs, coffee grinders, coffee-making equipment, filters, storage containers, and other accessories. Smaller stores and kiosks typically sold a full line of coffee beverages, a limited selection of whole-bean coffees, and a few hardware items.
In recent years, the company began selling special jazz and blues CDs, which in some cases were special compilations that had been put together for Starbucks to use as store background music. The idea for selling the CDs originated with a Starbucks store manager who had worked in the music industry and selected the new "tape of the month" Starbucks played as background in its stores. He had gotten compliments from customers wanting to buy the music they heard and suggested to senior executives that there was a market for the company's music tapes. Research that involved looking through two years of comment cards turned up hundreds asking Starbucks to sell the music it played in its stores. The Starbucks CDs, created from the Capitol Records library, proved a significant addition to the company's product line. Some of the CDs were specifically collections designed to tie in with new blends of coffee that the company was promoting. Starbucks also sold Oprah's Book Club selections, the profits of which were donated to a literacy fund supported by the Starbucks Foundation.
The company was constantly engaged in efforts to develop new ideas, new products, and new experiences for customers that belonged exclusively to Starbucks. Schultz and other senior executives drummed in the importance of always being open to re-inventing the Starbucks experience.
Store Ambience
Starbucks management looked upon each store as a billboard for the company and as a contributor to building the company's brand and image. Each detail was scrutinized to enhance the mood and ambience of the store, to make sure everything signaled "best of class" and that it reflected the personality of the community and the neighborhood. The thesis was "Everything matters." The company went to great lengths to make sure the store fixtures, the merchandise displays, the colors, the artwork, the banners, the music, and the aromas all blended to create a consistent, inviting, stimulating environment that evoked the romance of coffee, that signaled the company's passion for coffee, and that rewarded customers with ceremony, stories, and surprise. Starbucks was recognized for its sensitivity to neighborhood conservation with the Scenic America's award for excellent design and "sensitive reuse of spaces within cities."
To try to keep the coffee aromas in the stores pure, Starbucks banned smoking and asked employees to refrain from wearing perfumes or colognes. Prepared foods were kept covered so customers would smell coffee only. Colorful banners and posters were used to keep the look of Starbucks stores fresh and in keeping with seasons and holidays. Company designers came up with artwork for commuter mugs and T-shirts in different cities that was in keeping with each city's personality (peach-shaped coffee mugs for Atlanta, pictures of Paul Revere for Boston and the Statue of Liberty for New York).
To make sure that Starbucks' stores measured up to standards, the company used "mystery shoppers" who posed as customers and rated each location on a number of criteria.
Building a Top Management Team
Schultz continued to strengthen Starbucks' top management team, hiring people with extensive experience in managing and expanding retail chains. Orin Smith, who had an MBA from Harvard and 13 years' experience at Deloitte and Touche, was brought in as chief financial officer in 1990 and then was promoted to president and chief operating officer in 1994. The four key executives during the company's formative years—Howard Schultz, Dave Olsen, Howard Behar, and Orin Smith—contributed the most to defining and shaping the company's values, principles, and culture. As the company grew, additional executives were added in marketing, store supervision, specialty sales, human resources, finance, and information systems. Schultz also took care to add people to Starbucks' board of directors who had experience growing a retail chain and who could add valuable perspectives.
Employee Training
Accommodating fast growth also meant putting in systems to recruit, hire, and train baristas and store managers. Starbucks' vice president for human resources used some simple guidelines in screening candidates for new positions: "We want passionate people who love coffee . . . We're looking for a diverse workforce, which reflects our community. We want people who enjoy what they're doing and for whom work is an extension of themselves."16 Some 80 percent of Starbucks employees were white, 85 percent had some education beyond high school, and the average age was 26.
Every partner/barista hired for a retail job in a Starbucks store received at least 24 hours training in the first two to four weeks. The training included classes on coffee history, drink preparation, coffee knowledge (four hours), customer service (four hours), and retail skills, plus a four-hour workshop called "Brewing the Perfect Cup." Baristas were trained in using the cash register, weighing beans, opening the bag properly, capturing the beans without spilling them on the floor, holding the bag in a way that keeps air from being trapped inside, and affixing labels on the package exactly one-half inch over the Starbucks logo. Beverage preparation occupied even more training time, involving such activities as grinding the beans, steaming milk, learning to pull perfect (18- to 23-second) shots of espresso, memorizing the recipes of all the different drinks, practicing making the different drinks, and learning how to make drinks to customer specifications. There were sessions on how to clean the milk wand on the espresso machine, explain the Italian drink names to customers, sell an $875 home espresso machine, make eye contact with customers, and take personal responsibility for the cleanliness of the coffee bins. Everyone was drilled in the Star Skills, three guidelines for on-the-job interpersonal relations: (1) maintain and enhance self-esteem, (2) listen and acknowledge, and (3) ask for help. And there were rules to be memorized: milk must be steamed to at least 150 degrees Fahrenheit but never more than 170 degrees; every espresso shot not pulled within 23 seconds must be tossed; customers who order one pound of beans must be given exactly that—not .995 pounds or 1.1 pounds; never let coffee sit in the pot more than 20 minutes; always compensate dissatisfied customers with a Starbucks coupon that entitles them to a free drink.
Management trainees attended classes for 8 to 12 weeks. Their training went much deeper, covering not only the information imparted to baristas but also the details of store operations, practices and procedures as set forth in the company's operating manual, information systems, and the basics of managing people. Starbucks' trainers were all store managers and district managers with on-site experience. One of their major objectives was to ingrain the company's values, principles, and culture and to impart their knowledge about coffee and their passion about Starbucks.
Each time Starbucks opened stores in a new market, it undertook a major recruiting effort. Eight to 10 weeks before opening, the company placed ads to hire baristas and begin their training. It sent a Star team of experienced managers and baristas from existing stores to the area to lead the store-opening effort and to conduct one-on-one training following the company's formal classes and basic orientation sessions at the Starbucks Coffee School in San Francisco.
Product Supply
Dave Olsen, Starbucks' senior vice president for coffee, personally spearheaded Starbucks' efforts to secure top-notch coffee beans to supply the company's growing needs. He traveled regularly to coffee-producing countries—Colombia, Sumatra, Yemen, Antigua, Indonesia, Guatemala, New Guinea, Costa Rica, Sulawesi, Papua New Guinea, Kenya, Ethiopia, Java—building relationships with growers and exporters, checking on agricultural conditions and crop yields, and searching out varieties and sources that would meet Starbucks' exacting standards of quality and flavor. Reporting to Olsen was a group that created and tested new blends of beans from different sources.
Although most coffee was purchased in the commodity market—coffee was the world's second largest traded commodity—coffee of the quality sought by Starbucks was usually purchased on a negotiated basis at a substantial premium above commodity coffees, depending on supply and demand at the time of purchase. Coffee prices were subject to considerable volatility due to weather, economic, and political conditions in the growing countries, as well as agreements establishing export quotas or efforts on the part of the International Coffee Organization and the Association of Coffee Producing Countries to restrict coffee supplies.
Starbucks entered into fixed-price purchase commitments in order to secure an adequate supply of quality green coffee beans and to limit its exposure to fluctuating coffee prices in upcoming periods. When satisfactory fixed-price commitments were not available, the company purchased coffee futures contracts to provide price protection. Nonetheless, there had been occasions in years past when unexpected jumps in coffee prices had put a squeeze on the company's margins and necessitated an increase in the prices of its beverages and beans sold at retail.
Roasting Coffee Beans
Starbucks considered the roasting of its coffee beans to be an art form. Each batch was roasted in a powerful gas oven for 12 to 15 minutes. Highly trained and experienced roasting personnel monitored the process, using both smell and hearing, to judge when the beans were perfectly done—coffee beans make a popping sound when ready. Starbucks' standards were so exacting that roasters tested the color of the beans in a blood-cell analyzer and discarded the entire batch if the reading wasn't on target.
On a daily basis, when he wasn't traveling in search of coffee supplies, Dave Olsen checked coffee samples from the roasting process, sniffing the aromas, tasting sample cups, and recording his observations in a logbook.
In 1998, Starbucks had three roasting plants. The company's smallest plant, built in 1989 and originally thought to be big enough to supply the company's needs for the next 10 years, was dedicated to supplying the company's mail-order business. In 1993, a 305,000-square-foot plant was opened in Kent, Washington, just south of Seattle; its output mainly was being used to supply stores west of the Mississippi. In 1994, the company began construction of an $11 million roasting facility in York, Pennsylvania, that could be expanded to 1 million square feet to supply stores east of the Mississippi.
Bonding with Customers
About 5 million customers per week were patronizing Starbucks stores in early 1998. Stores did about half of their business by 11 am. Loyal customers patronized a Starbucks store 15 to 20 times a month, spending perhaps $50 monthly. Some customers were Starbucks fanatics, coming in daily. Baristas became familiar with regular customers, learning their names and their favorite drinks. Christine Nagy, a field director for Oracle Corporation in Palo Alto, California, told a Wall Street Journal reporter, "For me, it's a daily necessity or I start getting withdrawals."17 Her standard order was a custom drink: a decaf grande nonfat no-whip no-foam extra-cocoa mocha; when the baristas saw her come through the door, she told the reporter, "They just [said,] 'We need a Christine here.'"
Mail Order Sales
Starbucks published a mail-order catalog that was distributed six times a year and that offered coffee, candies and pastries, and select coffee-making equipment and accessories. A special business gift-giving catalog was mailed to business accounts during the 1997 Christmas holiday season. The company also had an electronic store on the Internet. In 1997, sales of this division were about $21.2 million, roughly 2 percent of total revenues; almost 50,000 mail-order customers were signed up to receive monthly deliveries of Starbucks coffee as of late 1997. Starbucks management believed that its direct-response marketing effort helped pave the way for retail expansion into new markets and reinforced brand recognition in existing markets.
Joint Ventures
In 1994, after months of meetings and experimentation, PepsiCo and Starbucks entered into a joint venture arrangement to create new coffee-related products for mass distribution through Pepsi channels, including cold coffee drinks in a bottle or can. Howard Schultz saw this as a major paradigm shift with the potential to cause Starbucks business to evolve in heretofore unimaginable directions; he thought it was time to look for ways to move Starbucks out into more mainstream markets. Cold coffee products had generally met with very poor market reception, except in Japan, where there was an $8 billion market for ready-to-drink coffee-based beverages. Nonetheless, Schultz was hoping the partners would hit on a new product to exploit a good-tasting coffee extract that had been developed by Starbucks' recently appointed director of research and development. The joint venture's first new product, Mazagran, a lightly flavored carbonated coffee drink, was a failure; when test- marketed in southern California, some consumers liked it and some hated it. While people were willing to try it the first time, partly because the Starbucks name was on the label, repeat sales proved disappointing. Despite the clash of cultures and the different motivations of the two partners, the partnership held together because of the good working relationship that evolved between Howard Schultz and Pepsi's senior executives. Then Schultz, at a meeting to discuss the future of Mazagran, suggested, "Why not develop a bottled version of Frappuccino?"18 Starbucks had come up with the new cold coffee drink it called Frappuccino in the summer of 1995, and it had proved to be a big hot-weather seller; Pepsi executives were enthusiastic. After months of experimentation, the joint venture product research team came up with a shelf-stable version of Frappuccino that tasted quite good. It was tested in West Coast supermarkets in the summer of 1996; the response was overwhelming, with sales running 10 times over projections and 70 percent repeat business. In September 1996, the partnership invested in three bottling facilities to make Frappuccino, with plans to begin wider distribution. Sales of Frappuccino reached $125 million in 1997 and achieved national supermarket penetration of 80 percent. Sales were projected to reach $500 million in 1998; Starbucks management believed that the market for Frappuccino would ultimately exceed $1 billion.
In October 1995 Starbucks partnered with Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream to supply coffee extract for a new line of coffee ice cream made and distributed by Dreyer's under the Starbucks brand. The new line, featuring such flavors as Dark Roast Espresso Swirl, JavaChip, Vanilla MochaChip, Biscotti Bliss, and Caffe Almond Fudge, hit supermarket shelves in April 1996; by July, Starbucks coffee-flavored ice cream was the top-selling superpremium brand in the coffee segment. In 1997, two new low-fat flavors were added to complement the original six flavors, along with two flavors of ice cream bars; all were well received in the marketplace. Additional new ice cream products were planned for 1998.
Also in 1995, Starbucks worked with Seattle's Redhook Ale Brewery to create Double Black Stout, a stout beer with a shot of Starbucks coffee extract in it.
Licensed Stores and Specialty Sales
In recent years Starbucks had begun entering into a limited number of licensing agreements for store locations in areas where it did not have ability to locate its own outlets. The company had an agreement with Marriott Host International that allowed Host to operate Starbucks retail stores in airport locations, and it had an agreement with Aramark Food and Services to put Starbucks stores on university campuses and other locations operated by Aramark. Starbucks received a license fee and a royalty on sales at these locations and supplied the coffee for resale in the licensed locations. All licensed stores had to follow Starbucks' detailed operating procedures, and all managers and employees who worked in these stores received the same training given to Starbucks managers and store employees.
Starbucks also had a specialty sales group that provided its coffee products to restaurants, airlines, hotels, universities, hospitals, business offices, country clubs, and select retailers. One of the early users of Starbucks coffee was Horizon Airlines, a regional carrier based in Seattle. In 1995, Starbucks entered into negotiations with United Airlines to have Starbucks coffee served on all United flights. There was much internal debate at Starbucks about whether such a move made sense for Starbucks and the possible damage to the integrity of the Starbucks brand if the quality of the coffee served did not measure up. After seven months of negotiation and discussion over coffee-making procedures, United Airlines and Starbucks came up with a way to handle quality control on some 500-plus planes with varying equipment, and Starbucks became the coffee supplier to the 20 million passengers flying United each year.
In addition, Starbucks made arrangements to supply an exclusive coffee blend to Nordstrom's for sale only in Nordstrom stores, to operate coffee bars in Barnes & Noble bookstores, and to offer coffee service at some Wells Fargo Bank locations in California. Most recently, Starbucks began selling its coffees in Chapters, a Toronto book retailer with sites throughout Canada, and in Costco warehouse club stores. A 1997 agreement with U.S. Office Products gave Starbucks the opportunity to provide its coffee to workers in 1.5 million business offices. In fiscal 1997, the specialty sales division generated sales of $117.6 million, equal to 12.2 percent of total revenues.
International Expansion
In markets outside the continental United States (including Hawaii), Starbucks' strategy was to license a reputable and capable local company with retailing know-how in the target host country to develop and operate new Starbucks stores. In some cases, Starbucks was a joint venture partner in the stores outside the continental Untied States. Starbucks created a new subsidiary, Starbucks Coffee International (SCI), to orchestrate overseas expansion and begin to build the Starbucks brand name globally via licensees; Howard Behar was president of SCI.
Going into 1998, SCI had 12 retail stores in Tokyo, 7 in Hawaii, 6 in Singapore, and 1 in the Philippines. Agreements had been signed with licensees to begin opening stores in Taiwan and Korea in 1998. The company and its licensees had plans to open as many as 40 stores in the Pacific Rim by the end of September 1998. The licensee in Taiwan foresaw a potential of 200 stores in that country alone. The potential of locating stores in Europe and Latin America was being explored.
Corporate Responsibility
Howard Schultz's effort to "build a company with soul" included a broad-based program of corporate responsibility, orchestrated mainly through the Starbucks Foundation, set up in 1997. Starbucks was the largest corporate contributor in North America to CARE, a worldwide relief and development organization that sponsored health, education, and humanitarian aid programs in most of the Third World countries where Starbucks purchased its coffee supplies; Starbucks began making annual corporate contributions to CARE when it became profitable in 1991. In addition, CARE samplers of coffee and CARE-related mugs, backpacks, and T-shirts were offered in the company's mail-order catalog; a portion of the price on all sales was donated to CARE. In 1995 Starbucks began a program to improve the conditions of workers in coffee-growing countries, establishing a code of conduct for its growers and providing financial assistance for agricultural improvement projects. In 1997, Starbucks formed an alliance with Appropriate Technology International to help poor, small-scale coffee growers in Guatemala increase their income by improving the quality of their crops and their market access; the company's first-year grant of $75,000 went to fund a new processing facility and set up a loan program for a producer cooperative. Starbucks stores also featured CARE in promotions and had organized concerts with Kenny G and Mary Chapin Carpenter to benefit CARE.
Starbucks had an Environmental Committee that looked for ways to reduce, reuse, and recycle waste, as well as contribute to local community environmental efforts. There was also a Green Team, consisting of store managers from all regions. The company had donated almost $200,000 to literacy improvement efforts, using the profits from store sales of Oprah's Book Club selections. Starbucks stores participated regularly in local charitable projects of one kind or another, donating drinks, books, and proceeds from store-opening benefits. The company's annual report listed nearly 100 community organizations which Starbucks and its employees had supported in 1997 alone. Employees were encouraged to recommend and apply for grants from the Starbucks Foundation to benefit local community literacy organizations.
On the Fourth of July weekend in 1997, three Starbucks employees were murdered in the company's store in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. Starbucks offered a $100,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the murderer(s) and announced it would reopen the store in early 1998 and donate all future net proceeds of that store to a Starbucks Memorial Fund that would make annual grants to local groups working to reduce violence and aid the victims of violent crimes.
Competitors
Going into 1997, there were an estimated 8,000 specialty coffee outlets in the United States. Starbucks' success was prompting a number of ambitious rivals to scale up their expansion plans. Observers believed there was room in the category for two or three national players, maybe more. Starbucks' closest competitor, Second Cup, a Canadian franchisor with stores primarily in Canada, was less than one-third its size; Second Cup owned Gloria Jeans, a franchisor of specialty coffees, with stores located primarily in malls throughout the United States. No other rival had as many as 250 stores, but there were at least 20 small local and regional chains that aspired to grow into rivals of Starbucks, most notably New World Coffee, Coffee People, Coffee Station, Java Centrale, and Caribou Coffee. Observers expected many of the local and regional chains to merge in efforts to get bigger and better position themselves as an alternative to Starbucks. In addition, numerous restaurants were picking up on the growing popularity of specialty coffees and had installed machines to serve espresso, cappuccino, lattè, and other coffee drinks to their customers.
The company also faced competition from nationwide coffee manufacturers such as Kraft General Foods (the parent of Maxwell House), Procter & Gamble (the owner of the Folger's brand), and Nestlé, which distributed their coffees through supermarkets. There were also a number of specialty coffee companies that sold whole-bean coffees in supermarkets. Because many consumers were accustomed to purchasing their coffee supplies at supermarkets, it was easy for them to substitute these products for Starbucks.
Building the Starbucks Brand
So far, Starbucks had spent very little money on advertising, preferring instead to build the brand cup by cup with customers and depend on word-of-mouth and the appeal of its storefronts. The company was, however, engaged in a growing effort to extend the Starbucks brand and penetrate new markets. In addition to expanding internationally, venturing into ice cream with Dreyer's and into Frappuccino with Pepsi, partnering with licensees, and developing specialty and mail-order sales, Starbucks had recently begun selling its coffees in supermarkets.
Supermarket sales were test-marketed in over 500 stores in Chicago in the summer of 1997. Management believed that the tests confirmed the appeal of offering Starbucks coffee to existing customers in convenient supermarket locations while at the same time introducing new customers to its products. Two-thirds of all coffee was sold in supermarkets. In November 1997, Starbucks hired Nestlé veteran, Jim Ailing, as senior vice president of grocery operations to direct Starbucks' supermarket sales effort. The company started rolling out supermarket sales of its coffees in 10 major metropolitan areas in the spring of 1998. Starbucks coffee sold in supermarkets featured distinctive, elegant packaging; prominent positions in grocery aisles; and the same premium quality as that sold in its own stores. Product freshness was guaranteed by Starbucks' FlavorLock packaging, and the price per pound paralleled the prices in Starbucks' retail stores.
The company was also said to be testing "light roast" coffee blends for those customers who found its current offerings too strong. And, in the summer of 1997, Starbucks quietly test-marketed four 20 percent fruit-juice beverages in one market.19 The single-serve bottled drinks were priced around $2, and at least one contained caffeine. Also on the new-product front was an apple cider made exclusively for Starbucks by Nantucket Nectars. Plus, the company was selling chocolate bars and other candy, and had plans to bring candy production in-house if sales went well enough.
The Future
Industry analysts in 1998 saw Starbucks as being well on its way to becoming the Nike or Coca-Cola of the specialty coffee segment. It was the only company with anything close to national market coverage. The company's most immediate objective was to have 2,000 stores in operation by the year 2000. Its longer range objective was to become the most recognized and respected brand of coffee in the world. The company's efforts to greatly increase its sphere of strategic interest via its joint ventures with Pepsi and Dreyer's, its move to sell coffee in supermarkets, and the possibility of marketing fruit-juice drinks and candy under the Starbucks label represented an ongoing drive on Schultz's part to continually reinvent the way Starbucks did business.
In order to sustain the company's growth and make Starbucks a strong global brand, Schultz believed that the company had to challenge the status quo, be innovative, take risks, and alter its vision of who it was, what it did, and where it was headed. Under his guidance, management was posing a number of fundamental strategic questions: What could Starbucks do to make its stores an even more elegant "third place" that welcomed, rewarded, and surprised customers? What new products and new experiences could the company provide that would uniquely belong to or be associated with Starbucks? What could coffee be—besides being hot or liquid? How could Starbucks reach people who were not coffee drinkers? What strategic paths should Starbucks pursue to achieve its objective of becoming the most recognized and respected brand of coffee in the world?
Arthur A. Thompson, The University of AlabamaJohn E.Gamble, University of South Alabama

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

Starting a Business in a Down Economy

Starting Up in a Down Economy
Nobody loves a recession*. But many successful entrepreneurs say that, in retrospect, they were lucky to have launched their businesses in tough times.
By: Ryan McCarthy, Nadine Heintz, Bo Burlingham
Published May 2008

Case Study No. 1: How Method Weathered the Dot-com Bust
* A recession is commonly defined as two consecutive quarters during which the country's gross domestic product shrinks. It is too soon to say whether the economy is in a recession now.
When they look back on the early days of their start-up, Adam Lowry and Eric Ryan remember that a lot of potential investors laughed at them. The Bay Area, where they were living, was awash in Internet start-ups. Each week in 2000 brought another glitzy launch party or news that the scantest of business plans had attracted venture capital. Even office landlords were demanding equity from their dot-com tenants. Lowry and Ryan, who wanted to start a company to make -- of all things -- humdrum household products, were decidedly out of step with the times. "You had the sense that there was this real historical thing going on in the region, even if it was not going to end well," says Ryan.

Still, Ryan and Lowry felt they had a good idea. Method, their start-up, wouldn't sell just any household products. Its soap and cleaning supplies would be made from environmentally friendly ingredients and would come in chic packaging. Compared with the products of giants like Procter & Gamble (NYSE:PG) and Clorox (NYSE:CLX), Method's merchandise would be hip. So the partners passed on interesting and potentially lucrative job offers and pooled $100,000 in personal savings to get started.

You know what happened next: The go-go New Economy abruptly ran out of steam. Dot-coms ran out of money, layoffs were rampant, and the entire city of San Francisco seemed to suffer from an economic hangover. People started to worry openly about a recession.
Like most business owners facing hard times, Lowry and Ryan focused on their costs. They were expert bootstrappers, mixing cleaning solution in a bathtub, bottling it themselves, and driving around town to restock shelves. They would accost any store manager who would listen to their spiel. They returned to some stores three and four times before they got an order, and little by little their sales pitch improved. And the partners noticed something else: Compared with the situation a year before, when there seemed to be five start-ups for every idea for a business, the competition was relatively muted. "Starting a business in a recession is like vacationing in the off-season," says Ryan. "It's a little less crowded, and everything starts going on sale."
By spring of 2001, Lowry and Ryan had gotten small-batch production on track and had hired a CEO named Alastair Dorward. But Method's debt stood at $300,000, split among the three men's personal credit cards. Payments to their vendors were three or four months past due, and at one point Lowry and Ryan had just $16 left in the bank. "We had to appeal to the inner entrepreneur of each of our vendors," says Lowry. "We had to sell them on the fact that Eric and I could do something that had never been done before."

Lowry and Ryan also tried again to raise money, and with VCs falling out of love with dot-coms, they found that there was more interest in their idea. In early September 2001, the partners received a term sheet for $1 million -- a sum that would allow Method to get current on its bills and then begin to expand. They were set to close the round on September 11. Needless to say, the deal didn't go through right away; the partners finally closed in November. And there were some serious strings attached. Lowry and Ryan would receive $550,000 up front. Of that money, the legal fees associated with the transaction would eat up $110,000, and $300,000 would go to pay outstanding vendors' bills. That left Method with $140,000 in capital. To get their hands on the remaining $450,000, Lowry and Ryan were obliged to meet a key milestone: They would have to add distribution to 800 stores by March, which was just five months away.
The tenuous nature of Method's financial situation was underscored at the dinner Lowry, Ryan, and Dorward hosted to celebrate the deal. The partners gathered their investors plus their lawyers and accountants at an expensive restaurant in San Francisco. When the bill came, Lowry's credit card was declined. Then Ryan's card was declined. And Dorward's. Their backup cards were declined, too. "It's a good thing Eric knew the owner of the restaurant," says Lowry. "We convinced him we were good for it -- that that guy over there was about to give us a million bucks."

Method did make it into 800 stores by March -- though just barely. When Lowry and Ryan got the remainder of their Series A funding, they paid off old accounts and then jumped right back into fundraising mode. With the recession in full swing, venture capitalists were being very picky when it came to making new investments. But Method, which had been ignored barely 18 months earlier, was suddenly a Bay Area darling. "It was really interesting," says Lowry. "We used to be completely off investors' radar screen, but when the bubble burst, people were clamoring for us. Our business plan wasn't some sort of ad-based or online thing that was hard to understand. Our model was, 'Hey, we're going to make this cool product, and if you think we can sell a lot of it, then it's a good investment."

Being able to raise money in 2001 undoubtedly put Method on the growth path. By 2006, the company had $71 million in sales, and today the founders are pushing to reach $100 million. But Lowry and Ryan look at the period before they raised money, when they struggled and nearly drowned, as pivotal. In retrospect, the fact that they had to hone their pitch in countless meetings with store managers and vendors was fortuitous. They were practiced enough that by the time their big break came -- pitching Target for national distribution -- they didn't blow it. Which raises the question: Did the recession actually make Method better? The founders think so. As Ryan puts it, "The hungriest wolves hunt best."